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THE HOLY BIBLE AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Robert Fairchild Cushman*
The decision in 1953 of Tudor v. Board of Education' marks the
second time in five years that a decision by New Jersey's highest court
has focused public attention on the thorny problems surrounding the
use of the Bible in the public schools. Together with its sister case of
Doremus v. Board of Education,2 decided in 1950, it presents a number
of new and challenging constitutional questions not raised in the earlier
Bible reading cases and not yet answered in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
In the Doremus case a taxpayer challenged the validity of two statutes'
requiring the reading of at least five verses from the Old Testament
and permitting the recitation of the Lord's Prayer daily at the opening
of school. The Board of Education had ruled that those who wished
could be excused from this exercise. The complainant, who neither
objected to the content of the Bible reading nor asked that his daughter
be excused, contended only that this use of the Holy Scriptures consti-
tuted aid to religion in violation of the first amendment, made ap-
plicable to the states by the fourteenth. Despite his apparent lack of
injury the New Jersey court sustained his request for a declaratory
judgment and held that the Bible reading did not violate the United
States Constitution. The Constitution, said the court, forbids aid only to
sectarian religion-and reading the Bible is not sectarian.
In 1951 the Gideon's International asked permission of the Rutherford
Board of Education to distribute the "Gideon Bible" to all pupils in the
public schools as part of its campaign to "win men and women for the
Lord Jesus Christ."4 The Board approved the plan and a request form
was prepared and distributed to the pupils so their parents could signify
whether or not they wanted their child to have a Gideon Bible. Before
the books were distributed members of the Jewish and Catholic faiths
brought suit to enjoin the action. In the Tudor case the New Jersey
Supreme Court held the proposed distribution a violation of both state
and federal constitutions. Both constitutions, the court explained, forbid
sectarianism and permitting one sect to distribute its Bible in the schools
shows a preference for that sect.5
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 535, for biographical data.
1 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953).
2 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
3 N.J. Rev. Stat. 18:14-77, 78 (1940).
4 14 N.J. 31, 33, 100 A.2d 857, 858 (1953).
5 The court considered the nature of the book the deciding factor and placed scant
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Since 1854 state courts have dealt with cases involving the use of the
Bible in public schools. While some went one way and some the other,
the principal issue presented in each was that of "sectarianism" as dis-
tinguished from merely "religion." As in the New Jersey cases, if a
particular version or use of the Bible was found to be sectarian it was
held bad. No grounds existed on which these early cases could be ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of the United States' until 1947, when the
Court in Everson v. Board of Education made the establishment of
religion cause of the first amendment applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. In a classic statement the Court said that
"neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another.' 'r But neither in this case, which involved bus
service to parochial schools, nor in the two decisions dealing with "re-
leased time" which followed it,' did the Court distinguish between sec-
tarianism and religion. The New Jersey court, nevertheless, interpreted
the Supreme Court's words as meaning only sectarian religion and held
that while the distribution of the King James Bible was sectarian and
unconstitutional, reading the Old Testament and Lord's Prayer was not.
In view of the apparent inconsistency of these two opinions and their
debatable interpretation of the holdings of the United States Supreme
Court, it is important to consider how the New Jersey court reached its
conclusions.
BIBLE READING IN STATE COURTS
In dealing with the question of sectarianism the New Jersey court
followed a well trod path of constitutional theory embodied in the
earlier cases, and it is in the light of the long controversy from which
this theory emerged that the Tudor decision can best be understood and
evaluated. Bible reading in the public schools dates from a time when
this country was almost unanimously Protestant in faith and religion was
considered a proper part of a child's schooling. As a result of the inter-
faith struggle the points of doctrine on which the Protestants disagreed
emphasis on the machinery of distribution. Hence it may fairly be considered as a
Bible reading case.
6 In Hamilton v. Regents of the U. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934), the Supreme
Court first took jurisdiction of a state religious liberty case under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The cases which followed involved questions of religious
freedom, and it was not until Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), that the
Supreme Court finally took a case involving state aid to religion.
7 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
8 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952). These two cases are discussed below.
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had been gradually eliminated until the schooling, from a Protestant
viewpoint, had become almost completely nonsectarian. But with the
growth of a Catholic population in the years following the Irish famine
of 1830 there appeared a group to challenge what it considered Protes-
tant, and therefore sectarian, education in the public schools. While in
one or two of the state cases Jewish children complained that Christianity
was being taught, and in one case an atheist objected to all religious
teaching, in most of the cases a Catholic objected that the Bible used
in the school was the King James, or Protestant version, and that when
prayers were given and songs sung, they were Protestant prayers and
hymns. While a careful review of the twenty-odd cases involving Bible
reading falls to reveal any clear relation between the particular form of
religious exercise and its subsequent validity, clearly those involving
compulsion were held invalid more often than those that did not. In
three of the seven cases in which a pupil was required by law to parti-
cipate in religious ceremonies, the ceremonies were held invalid,9 while
in eleven of the thirteen not involving direct legal compulsion the court
sustained the religious activity involved.1" In one of these cases it was
claimed that the Bible was being used as a textbook rather than as a
religious exercise." Nor does the wording of the various constitutional
provisions involved appear to have weighed heavily in the outcome of
these cases, for the courts judging substantially the same facts under
almost identical constitutional provisions have come out with opposing
results. 2 Since essentially the same provisions have been interpreted
9 Compulsory Bible reading was sustained in Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. Law
Reg. 417 (Police Ct., Boston, Mass. 1859); Church v. Bullock, 20 Tex. Ct. Rep. 917, 109
S.W. 115 (1908); Spiller v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 127 (1866); held
void in People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910); State
ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226 N.W. 348 (1929); State v. Scheve, 65 Neb.
853, 91 N.W. 846 (1902). Compulsory attendance, but not the Bible reading itself, was
held void in People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927).
I' Bible reading held valid in Nessle v. Hum, 2 Ohio Dec. 60 (1894); Stevenson v.
Hanyon, 7 Pa. Dist. 585 (1898); Lewis v. Board of Education, 247 App. Div. 106, 286
N.Y. Supp. 174 (1st Dep't 1936); Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, 118 Mich. 560, 77
N.W. 250 (1898); People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927);
Kaplan v. Independent School Dist. 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927); Wilkerson v.
Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895 (1921); Hart v. School Dist., 2 Lanc. Law Rev. 346
(Pa., Mercer County Ct. 1885); Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475 (1884);
Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905); Billard v.
Board of Education, 69 Kan. 53, 76 Pac. 422 (1904); held invalid in State ex rel. Weiss v.
District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890); Herold v. Parish Board, 136 La. 1034,
68 So. 116 (1915).
11 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854).
12 Compare Texas Const. Art. I (under which compulsory Bible reading was sustained)
with Ill. Cost. Art. VIII (under which compulsory Bible reading was held void). Corn-
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both as permitting and prohibiting Bible reading one may conclude that
the crucial factor in any decision is the attitude of the particular court
concerning the respective rights of majority and minority religious groups
in society. Though these state courts have failed to achieve consistent
results, they have, nonetheless, built a coherent body of constitutional
theory, significant aspects of which find expression in the two decisions
of the New Jersey court.
The Case for Bible Reading
Three major arguments were relied upon in the long line of state cases
to show that Bible reading and prayers in the schools were constitutional:
first, the state constitutions did not intend to bar nonsectarian religion
from the schools; second, the religious exercises involved were in fact
nonsectarian; and tkird, such exercises did not discriminate against any-
one or otherwise abridge his civil rights or religious liberty.
I.
The constitutions, it was emphasized, could not have intended to ban
all religion from the schools. The framers of the constitutions were, in
general, devout men representing a society in which religion was a domi-
nant element, and it is unthinkable that they intended to bar all govern-
mental recognition of religion. In fact a number of state constitutions
clearly recognize God, at least in the preamble, and "it cannot," it was
reasoned, "be unconstitutional to teach what the constitution itself
affirms.' 13 The Michigan court pointed out that the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 (under the authority of which it had framed its constitution)
"declared that religion, morality and knowledge were necessary to good
government... and provided that, for these purposes, schools and the
means of education should forever be encouraged."14 Even the wording
of the constitutions seemed to support, or at least not to deny, the
propriety of teaching nonsectarian religion. Most of them forbade the
states to prefer one religion over others, or to teach or aid sectarian
religion. From these provisions two inferences were drawn. First, the
teaching of mere religious doctrines was not banned, since it would have
been as easy for the framers to ban "religious" doctrines as "sectarian"
pare also Colo. Const. Art. II, § 4, Art. V, § 34, Art. IX, § 8 (under which voluntary
Bible reading was sustained) with Wis. Const. Art. I, § 18, Art. X, § 3 (under which it
was held void).
Is State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 360, 226 N.W. 348, 355 (1929) (dis-
senting opinion).
14 Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, 118 Mich. 560, 565, 77 N.W. 250, 252 (1898).
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doctrines, had they so intended. Moreover, an injunction against relig-
ious preference implied permission to conduct "nonpreferential" religious
exercises. Second, a prohibition against sectarianism seemed to argue for
the existence of a nonsectarian religion that was not prohibited. If all
religion were sectarian why had not the framers simply banned all
religion?
II.
But is reading the Bible, coupled in most cases with prayers and
religious songs, in fact nonsectarian? The answer obviously depends
upon what is meant by sectarianism, which in turn depends upon who
defines the term. If Bible reading were to be sustained it was crucial
that the courts, rather than the religious sects, make the definition on
the bases of their own standards of judgment. Religious groups, it was
argued, would tend to define as sectarian anything to which they were
doctrinally opposed. Allowing them to define the term would give them
a veto power over the entire scholastic curriculum-a patent violation
of the separation of church and state.15 Moreover, to find the Bible (or
parts of it) nonsectarian, the court definition had to be a narrow one.
It was argued generally that to be sectarian a book must teach the
peculiar tenets of a particular sect. As the dissent in Ring v. Board of
Education' put it:
To hold that the Bible cannot be read in the public schools requires a
judicial determination that it teaches the doctrine of some sect, and if that
is so we ought to be able to say what sect.17
In Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District,'8 the court observed
that although a Catholic priest claimed that a particular prayer was
sectarian
he admits that there is nothing in it repugnant to the doctrines of his re-
ligious belief (Roman Catholic). Nor does he claim that it is promul-
gated, authorized, or used by any sect of religionists whatever. As neither
the form nor substance of the prayer complained of seem to represent any
peculiar view or dogma of any sect or denomination . . . it is not sec-
tarian .... 19
15 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 406 (1854); Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School
Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 617, 87 S.W. 792, 794 (1905); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. Law
Reg. 417, 424 (Police Ct., Boston, Mass. 1859). In the latter case the court gave the
doctrine a curious twist, holding that to allow Catholics to read the Douay version of
the Bible would be to introduce sectarianism into the school, while using the King James
version was nonsectarian.
16 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
17 Id. at 375, 92 N.E. at 265.
18 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905).
19 Id. at 615, 87 S.W. at 793.
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Nor, it was argued, did the adoption of an authorized version of the
Bible make that version sectarian. As the court in the Hackett case ex-
plained,
That the Bible, or any particular edition, has been adopted by one or
more denominations as authentic, or by them asserted to be inspired, can-
not make it a sectarian book. The book itself, to be sectarian, must show
that it teaches the peculiar dogmas of a sect as such, and not alone that
it is so comprehensive as to include them by the partial interpretation of
its adherents. Nor is a book sectarian merely because it was edited or
compiled by those of a particular sect. It is not the authorship nor
mechanical composition of the book, nor the use of it, but its contents,
that give it its character. 20
Since Jews, Mohammedans and Atheists would regard any version of
the Bible as sectarian, the courts commonly held that "sectarian" referred
only to Christian sects. In Wilkerson v. City of Rome," the Georgia
court quoted with approval a review of the Ring case in which Professor
Schofield of Northwestern University said:
The Jew may complain to a court as a taxpayer just exactly when, and
only when, a Christian may complain to a court as a taxpayer, i.e., when
the legislature authorizes such reading of the Bible... as gives one Chris-
tian sect a preference over others.22
The dissenting justices in the Ring case made clear the status of Atheists:
Freethinkers and atheists do not constitute a sect which is an organized
religious body, and the prohibition against sectarian instruction, which
relates only to the teaching of the doctrine of a particular sect, has no
application to them.23
It was easy to show, also, what absurd results would follow from any
broader interpretation of "sectarian." Not only would it make impossible
the teaching of all mythology and moral philosophy24 and those portions
of American history that deal with the Catholics, the Quakers and the
Puritans,25 but even the constitutions which teach freedom of worship
20 Id. at 617, 87 S.W. at 794.
21 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895 (1921).
22 Id. at 780, 110 S.E. at 904. See also 2 Schofield, Essays on Constitutional Law and
Equity 403-4 (1921). In Stevenson v. Hanyon, 7 Pa. Dist. 585, 590 (1898), the court said:
'We do not understand how the reading of the Bible in the public schools can be termed
sectarian. The Bible is not a sectarian book. On its broad foundation Christianity rests.
Without it there is no Christianity. This proposition is recognized by every division of
Christendom throughout the whole world. . . ." And revealing the intensity of its feel-
ing on the subject, the court added: "The assertion that the Bible, in either version, is a
sectarian book, borders on sacrilege, and this phase of the question deserves no further
consideration at our hands.'
23 245 ]]M. 334, 376, 92 N.E. 251, 265 (1910). (dissenting opinion).
24 Ibid.
25 State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 389, 226 N.W. 348, 366 (1929).
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might be sectarian to a sect that denied the right to teach children that
each can worship God in his own way.28
III.
The remaining argument of those defending Bible reading attempted
to show that those who phrased the constitutional guarantees of religious
liberty and freedom of worship had not intended to outlaw all religious
instruction in the public schools. The most important of these guarantees
comprise prohibitions against (1) forcing anyone to attend or support
a place of worship,2 7 (2) interference with the rights of conscience,28
and (3) any diminution or enlargement of anyone's civil rights because
of his religious faith.2
It would be foolish, it was argued, to consider a school a place of
worship merely because some worshipping was done there. That prohibi-
tion was obviously directed against compulsory attendance at, or support
of, a church, rather than the "casual use of a public building as a place
for offering prayer or doing other acts of religious worship." 30 To hold
otherwise would put a "strained construction" on the constitution, since
legislatures, penal institutions and the armed forces all employ the use
of chaplains and "no one has had the temerity to point to any constitu-
tional infringement therein, nor to contend that the halls of congress
. . . have been converted into 'places of worship.' ,31 Even if Bible
reading were conceded to be "worship," the increase in the tax burden
because of it was so inconsequential as not to constitute support of
religion.2
In the second place, no rights of conscience were being abridged. In
those cases where attendance upon the religious exercise was voluntary,
no one could possibly claim an infringement of his rights, since he was
26 Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 619, 87 S.W. 792, 794
(1905).
27 See e.g., Ill. Const. Art. VIII, § 3; Wis. Const. Art. I, § 18.
28 See e.g., Ala. Const. Art. I, § 3; Mich. Const. Art. I, § 4.
29 See, eg., Miss. Const. Art. I, § 5; Okla. Const. Art. I, § 2.
30 Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 369, 20 N.W. 475, 476 (1884).
31 Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 148, 214 N.W. 18, 20 (1927).
See also, Church v. Bullock, 20 Tex. Ct. Rep. 917, 921, 109 S.W. 115, 117 (1908) and
State v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 874, 91 N.W. 846, 848 (1902) (concurring opinion). In
State ex rel. Conway v. District Board, 162 Wis. 482, 156 N.W. 477 (1916), the Wisconsin
court held that during a school graduation exercise even a church is not a place of wor-
ship, despite the fact that the exercises themselves included prayers.
32 Wilkerson v. Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 781, 110 SE. 895, 904 (1921); Moore v. Monroe,
64 Iowa 367, 369, 20 N.W. 475, 476 (1884); Kaplan v. Independent School Dist., 171
Minn. 142, 148, 214 N.W. 18, 20 (1927).
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not compelled to listen to what he did not believe.33 Where attendance
was required, on the other hand, either he was not required to participate
actively in the exercise, 4 or if he was required to participate he was not
required to believe what he was taught.33
Finally, the constitutional prohibition against diminishing or enlarg-
ing anyone's civil rights because of his religious beliefs was designed only
to exclude religious tests for the right to vote and hold public office and
was not applicable to the question at hand.36 Furthermore, offering
religious instruction to a person who would not, for conscientious reasons,
take advantage of it was no more discriminatory than offering an elec-
tive course in Greek to those who did not want to take Greek.4
The Case Against Bible Reading
Those who attacked the validity of the Bible reading did not contend
that the state constitutions banned all religion from the schools. They
even argued positively for the use of passages from the Bible in con-
nection with secular studies,38 and in only one case was it suggested
that worship in the schools made the school a place of worship within
the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.39 Nor did anyone deny
that the framers must have envisaged a nonsectarian religion that could
be taught in the schools. The principal arguments were first, that if one
sect disapproved what was taught then it was sectarian teaching, assum-
ing without argument that religious groups, rather than the courts, were
the ones to decide what constituted sectarian differences; and second,
that it was impossible to teach or offer any religion in the public schools
without (1) abridging the civil liberties and religious equality of those
who do not approve the religion taught, and (2) forcing them to support
a religion in which they do not believe.
83 Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 615, 87 S.W. 792, 793
(1905); Moore v. Monroe, note 32 supra.
34 State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 377, 226 N.W. 348, 362 (1929); Spiller
v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 127, 130 (1866).
35 Commonwealth v. Cooke, 7 Am. Law Reg. 417, 423 (Police Ct., Boston, Mass.,
1859).
36 Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, 118 Mich. 560, 563, 77 N.W. 250, 251 (1898).
37 Ibid.
38 State v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 883, 91 N.W. 846 (1902) ; State ex rel. Weiss v. District
Board, 76 Wis. 177, 195, 44 N.W. 967, 974 (1890); State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55
S.D. 343, 353, 226 N.W. 348, 352 (1929).
39 State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 213, 44 N.W. 967, 979 (1890)
(concurring opinion).
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I.
The whole concept of a nonsectarian religion, it was argued, was a
paradox. "Granting," said the court in the Ring case, "that instruction
on these subjects is desirable, yet the sects do not agree on what instruc-
tion shall be given. Any instruction on any one of the subjects is neces-
sarily sectarian, because, while it may be consistent with the doctrines
of one or many of the sects, it will be inconsistent with the doctrine of
one or more of them."'4 Furthermore, the version of the Bible to be used
is at the root of many of the differences between Christian sects,4 and
it is therefore impossible to consider the Bible a nonsectarian book.
"The only means of preventing sectarian instruction in the schools,"
the Ring case concluded, "is to exclude altogether religious instruction,
by means of the reading of the Bible or otherwise."42
II.
Any religious instruction, it was urged, also violates religious equality.
The use of the King James Bible gives one group the religious teaching
it desires at the expense of all, puts the stamp of official approval on the
religious beliefs of one group "and thus discriminates in favor of and
aids the Protestant sects .... 43 Any use of the New Testament gives
preference to Christians over Jews who do not believe in the divinity of
Christ.44 Nor, it was emphasized, does excusing a child from these
exercises abolish their discriminatory nature. Not only are the child's
parents still paying for a religious education from which they cannot
benefit,45 but the very fact of excusing the child is an admission that
what is taught discriminates against the religious beliefs of some, and
"the exclusion of a pupil from this part of the school exercise in which
the rest of the school joins, separates him from his fellows ... subjects
him to a religious stigma and places him at a disadvantage in the school
which the law never contemplated."46 As the Wisconsin court in State
ex rel. Weiss v. District Board47 explained:
40 245 Ill. 334, 346, 92 N.E. 251, 255 (1910).
41 State v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 870, 91 N.W. 846, 847 (1902).
42 245 Il. 334, 348, 92 N.E. 251, 255 (1910).
43 Wilkerson v. Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 786, 110 S.E. 895, 906 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
44 Herold v. Parish Board, 136 La. 1034, 1047, 68 So. 116, 121 (1915).
45 Pfeiffer v. Board of Education, 118 Mich. 560, 579, 77 N.W. 250, 257 (1898) (dissent-
ing opinion).
46 State ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 I1. 334, 351, 92 N.E. 251, 256 (1910).
See also State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 199, 44 N.W. 967, 975 (1890);
Herold v. Parish Board, 136 La. 1034, 1049, 68 So. 116, 121 (1915).
47 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).
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When... a small minority of the pupils in the public school is excluded,
for any cause, from a stated school exercise, particularly when such cause
is apparent hostility to the Bible which a majority of the pupils have been
taught to revere, from that moment the excluded pupil loses caste with
his fellows, and is liable to be regarded with aversion and subjected to
reproach and insult. . . .The practice in question tends to destroy the
equality of the pupils which the constitution seeks to establish and pro-
tect, and puts a portion of them to serious disadvantage. .... 48
The Arguments in the New Jersey Court
The New Jersey court in the Doremus and Tudor cases, although it
was considering the federal as well as its own state constitution, followed
the traditional pattern of argument spelled out in the state court deci-
sions. The confusing thing about the two cases is this: in the Doremus
case the court accepted one set of arguments, and then in the Tudor
case, while reaffirming its previous decision, accepted the opposing set
of arguments. And since these arguments concern the technique by
which sectarianism is defined, rather than the definition itself, they would
appear to be irreconcilable.
The Doremus decision followed closely the pattern of argument laid
out by those who sustained Bible reading, i.e., there was no intent to
bar Bible reading; it was nonsectarian; and it neither abridged religious
liberty nor constituted support of religion. First, said the court, it was
not "the intent of the First Amendment that the existence of a Supreme
Being should be negated and that the governmental recognition of God
should be suppressed."4 9 Such recognition, it was pointed out, appears
in such things as the Declaration of Independence, our national anthem,
the existence of chaplains in the Congress and the armed forces, in the
oath taken by federal judges and the motto on our coins. New Jersey
constitutions, including the one adopted in 1948, have included references
to Almighty God and laws against blasphemy have long been on the
statute books. Not only is the recognition of God not forbidden, but
the court gives the argument a modern touch by suggesting that the
positive fostering of religion may be part of the fight against Com-
munism.
It may be a tragic experience for this country and for its conception of
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness if our people lose their religious
feeling and are left to live their lives without faith .... It may be of the
highest importance to the nation that the people remain theistic, not
that one or another sect or denomination may survive, but that belief in
God shall abide.... Organized atheistic society is making a determined
drive for supremacy by conquest as well as by infiltration. Recent his-
48 Id. at 199, 44 N.W. at 975.
49 5 N.J. 435, 439, 75 A.2d 880, 882 (1950).
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tory has demonstrated that when such a' totalitarian power comes into
control it exercises a ruthless supremacy over men and ideas, and over
such remnants of religious worship as it permits to exist.... Faced with
this threat to the continuance of elements deeply imbedded in our national
life the adoption of a public policy with respect thereto is a reasonable
function to be performed by those on whom responsibility lies.5 °
In holding, in the second place, that the Old Testament and Lord's
Prayer were nonsectarian the court (1) defined sectarianism for itself,
(2) defined it narrowly enough to include only Jews and Christians, and
(3) appeared to insist that to be sectarian a document had to teach the
peculiar doctrines of some sect. The Old Testament, it was explained,
was accepted by Catholics, Protestants and Jews alike, and even the
Lord's Prayer, accepted in slightly different versions by Catholics and
Protestants, was based on an old Jewish prayer called the Kaddish.
Despite the appellant's plea that "the context in which the Lord's Prayer
is presented in the New Testament reveals it to be a prayer offered as
avowedly contrary to Jewish practices,"5 1 the court found it nonsectarian.
"We find nothing in the Lord's Prayer," the court concluded, "that is
controversial, ritualistic, or dogmatic."52 Although recognizing the ex-
istence of religious groups to whom even the Old Testament might be
sectarian, the court emphasizes that "in this country they are numerically
small and, in point of impact upon our national life, negligible," '5 and
explained that while these groups did not lose their constitutional rights
by being small, they were subject to the laws and mores of a Judeo-
Christian country. Taking the atheist as an example:
[H]e has all the protection of the constitution; he may not be held to
any religious function or to the support, financial or otherwise, of a re-
ligious establishment; he may entertain his belief or the lack of belief
as he will; but he lives in a country where theism is in the warp and woof
of the social and the governmental fabric and he has no authority to
eradicate from governmental activities every vestige of the existence of
God.5"
Nor, in the third place, did the Bible reading statutes abridge civil
rights and religious equality or constitute support of religion. Any claim
that rights of conscience might have been abridged, the court said, was
refuted by the fact that those not wishing to attend the Bible reading
need not do so. Moreover, "it is not charged and it is neither conceded
nor proved that the brief interruption in the day's schooling caused by
5o Id. at 451, 75 A.2d at 888.
51 Brief for Appellants, p. 3, Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., note 49 supra.
52 5 N.J. 435, 451, 75 A.2d 880, 888 (1950).
53 Id. at 449, 75 A.2d at 887.
54 Ibid.
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compliance with the statute adds cost to the school expenses or varies
by more than an incomputable scintilla the economy of the day's work."' '55
Appellants in the case had presented all the basic arguments against
the validity of the Bible reading, i.e., it favors Christians and Jews over
all other religions and atheists, excusing pupils is merely an admission
that the action is discriminatory, and in excusing some pupils the state
is fostering divisive groups who ridicule one another for their faith or
lack of it.56 These were the arguments that had proved persuasive in
those states where Bible reading was held invalid. But the essentially
nonadversary nature of the Doremus suit57 played a vital part in the
decision. Appellants appeared only as citizens and .taxpayers, not as
persons who objected on religious grounds to the use of the Bible.
Furthermore, only one of the taxpayers had a child in school, and she
apparently did not object to the Bible reading nor ask to be excused
from it. So while the arguments were duly presented, any claim that
civil rights had been infringed was palpably weakened. In the language
of the court:
No one is before us asserting that his religious practices have been inter-
fered with or that his right to worship in accordance with the dictates of
his conscience has been suppressed. No religious sect is a party to the
cause. No representative of, or spokesman for, a religious body has at-
tacked the statute here or below.... No violated rights are urged.58
When it faced these same problems in the Tudor case the court took
a fundamentally different approach. True, it did underscore a superficial
distinction between the two cases by noting that in Doremus it had
merely held "the Old Testament and Lord's Prayer, pronounced with-
out comment, are not sectarian,"59 while "here the issue is the distribu-
tion of the New Testament."6 ° And while it acknowledged that a number
of legal scholars considered the Bible a nonsectarian "universal book of
the Christian world," it emphasized that "in many of these statements
55 Id. at 439, 75 A.2d at 882.
56 Brief for Appellants, Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., note 49 supra.
57 "It is not charged that the practice required by the statute conflicts with the con-
victions of either mother or daughter. Apparently the sole purpose and the only func-
tion of plaintiffs is that they shall assume the role of actors so that there may be a suit
which will invoke a court ruling upon the constitutionality of the statute. Respondents
urge that under the circumstances the question is moot as to the plaintiff-appellants and
that our declaratory judgment statute may not properly be used in justification of such
a proceeding. . . . The point has substance but we have nevertheless concluded to dis-
pose of the appeal on its merits." 5 N.J. 435, 439, 75 A.2d 880, 882 (1950).
58 5 N.J. 435, 439, 75 A.2d 880, 881 (1950).
59 14 N.J. 31, 47, 100 A.2d 857, 866 (1953).
60 Id. at 48, 100 A.2d at 866.
[Vol. 40
BIBLE AND THE SCHOOLS
the question of the New Testament was not discussed."'" Most im-
portant to the decision, however, was the court's changed approach to
defining sectarianism. Rather than search the King James Bible for ex-
plicit sectarian teaching, the court accepted as sectarian those things
which the religious groups considered "unacceptable," and allowed each
group to determine for itself the doctrinal significance of parts and
versions of the Bible. After reviewing the testimony of members of
the Jewish and Catholic clergy, the court concluded that
[a] review of the testimony at the trial convinces us that the King James
version or Gideon Bible is unacceptable to those of the Jewish faith.62
Nor is there any doubt that the King James version of the Bible is as
unacceptable to Catholics as the Douay version is to Protestants. Accord-
ing to the testimony in this case the canon law of the Catholic Church
provides that "Editions of the original text of the sacred scriptures pub-
lished by non-Catholics are forbidden ipso jure."63
On the basis of this "uncontradicted evidence presented by the plaintiff
. . ." the court concluded that "as far as the Jewish faith is concerned,
the Gideon Bible is a sectarian book.
Having determined that the Gideon Bible was sectarian the court had
no trouble deciding that its distribution gave a preference to one sect
over others and abridged the religious freedom of those who did not want
a copy. Abandoning such reliance as it had placed in the Doremus case
on the fact that "the presence of the scholar at, and his participation in,
that exercise is ... voluntary,"'65 the court concluded that there was, in
fact, coercion. It rejected the contention that "no one is forced to take
a New Testament"66 and that this is merely the "accommodation" of
religion held permissible by the Supreme Court of the United States.67
It quoted at length and with approval the statement in the Weiss case
and others to show that excusing a pupil creates a divisive and dis-
criminatory influence in the school.6
It is quite apparent on reading the two cases that a deciding factor
was the absence in one and the presence in the other of a bdna fide
61 Id. at 47, 100 A.2d at 866.
62 Id. at 46, 100 A.2d at 865.
63 Id. at 47, 100 A.2d at 865. The court mentions this testimony, although the Catholic
plaintiff had withdrawn so the issue was moot as to him.
64 Id. at 48, 100 A.2d at 866.
65 5 N.J. 435, 454, 75 A.2d 880, 889 (1950).
66 14 NJ. 31, 48, 100 A.2d 857, 866 (1953). Cf. Miler v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244
P. 2d 520 (1952), where the court enjoined having piles of religious pamphlets conspicuous
in the schoolroom.
67 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
68 14 N.J. 31, 49, 100 A.2d 857, 867- (1953). See note 48 supra.
1955]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
allegation of religious disapproval of what was being done. Although
the court had tried to decide the Doremus case on the broad issues
involved, the simple fact was that no one in that case was alleging injury.
Since in the long run the proper decision of constitutional questions
involves a delicate weighing of the rights of individuals against the rights
of the community, the absence of an injury in the Doremus case was
bound to influence that determination. In the Tudor case, on the other
hand, because the individual right of conscience was actually involved, it
was natural that a different balance between the competing forces should
be struck-a balance which would find emphasis throughout the opinion.
But there is, in addition, a marked difference in the tone of the two
opinions. In Doremus the court speaks with strong approval of state
legislation enacted "so that at the beginning of the day the children
should pause to hear a few words from the wisdom of the ages and to
bow the head in humility before the Supreme Power... ."69 One third
of the Tudor opinion, in contrast, is devoted to tracing historically the
long struggle for individual religious freedom from state interference.
What, then, of the statement in Tudor that "we adhere to the Doremus
case, but its holding does not apply here . . ."?71 When facts are
different a distinction is always possible. But it is still a King James
Old Testament and a King James and Christian Lord's Prayer, and the
Catholics and Jews are certain to consider them Protestant and hence
sectarian. In deciding Tudor the court has let the religious sects make
such decisions for themselves, and in so doing has abandoned the tech-
nique of decision that makes it possible to sustain Bible reading in the
public schools.
Bible Reading and the Supreme Court of the United States
The New Jersey court, in deciding Doremus and Tudor, relied upon
a distinction between sectarian and nonsectarian religion, and contended
that only state aid to sectarian religion was forbidden by the United
States Constitution. Sooner or later the Supreme Court will get a case
squarely raising this issue. So far it has decided only three cases in-
volving religion and the public schools' and in none of them has this
distinction been an important factor.
Everson v. Board of Education,72 the first such case to come to the
69 5 N.J. 435, 451, 75 A.2d 880, 888 (1950).
70 14 NJ. 31, 48, 100 A.2d 857, 866 (1953).
71 Appeal in the Doremus case was dismissed after hearing, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Cer-
tiorari in the Tudor case was denied, 348 U.S. 816, 75 S.Ct. 25 (1954).
72 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Supreme Court, involved the right of New Jersey to supply bus trans-
portation at public expense to children attending Catholic schools. While
the entire Court agreed that the first amendment forbade the states to
aid religion, five of the justices decided that children, rather than religion,
were being aided. The second case was McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion73 in which an atheist challenged the so-called "released time" pro-
gram of Champaign, Illinois. Here the state was allowing religious groups
to come into the classrooms and conduct religious classes during school
hours, those who wished to attend being "released" from their secular
studies at the request of their parents. Eight members of the Court held
that this use of school property together with the cooperation of the
school in providing the pupils for religious classes amounted to an un-
constitutional aid to religion. Following the decision in the McCollum
case the state of New York reorganized its released time program so that
the religious classes were not conducted on the school premises. The
only participation of the school authorities was the release of pupils
at the request of their parents to take religious training conducted by
"duly constituted" religious bodies. The church groups reported at-
tendance to the school, and those who did not attend church classes had
to stay in school. Six justices agreed in Zorach v. Clauson74 that this met
the objections of the McCollum case. The cooperation of the school in
releasing the pupils was held to be "accommodation" rather than aid.
Each of these cases involved situations and problems which differ in
many fundamental ways from those raised by reading the Bible in the
public schools. Most important is the fact that these cases involved
teaching of religion by religious groups. The school did not provide the
teachers, and such aid as was given religion was of an ancillary nature,
involving the use of school property and the cooperation of the school
administration. The Court had to decide whether these things constituted
aid to religion, but in each case it was clear that religious sects and sec-
tarian religion were involved. In reaching its decision the Court trod
the delicate path between the first amendment prohibition of an "estab-
lishment of religion" on the one hand and the equally strict mandate
against "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion on the other. In the
Everson and McCollum cases it traced out what appeared to be a logi-
cally consistent theoretical interpretation of the meaning of the first
amendment. All agreed that both federal and state governments were
forbidden to set up an established church. And despite the objection of
73 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
74 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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those who wished to see religion aided, they went on to say that the
state could not "aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another."7 5 This, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained, "is a re-
quirement to abstain from fusing functions of Government and of relig-
ious sects, not merely to treat them all equally. 75 Explicitly ruled
out is the concept that the first amendment is an "equal protection"
clause among religions. And while the Court is clear that religion can-
not be aided, it also concedes that it cannot be discriminated against.
What is called for is a doctrine of state neutrality. But what is neu-
trality? Under a constitutional system in which the state can aid lay
social and economic groups but is forbidden to aid religion, what con-
stitutes a neutral position?
It is this writer's contention that the answer lies in distinguishing
between the religious functions of a religious organization, and its other
attributes and characteristics. Clearly the state cannot aid or hinder it
in the performance of its religious functions. 77 But if its other charac-
teristics place it in a class of institutions which the state undertakes to
aid or regulate, it should receive such aid or regulation on the same basis
as the other institutions in its class. As this writer has argued elsewhere,
"a church may receive police protection when classed as property, tax
exemption when classed as a non-profit institution, sewage connections
when classed as a building, and yet be denied financial aid when classed
as a religious institution, since such a class may not validly be given
public aid."78  Thus if a state allows social groups, without regard to
their ideas or purposes, to use a public park, extending this permission
to a religious group would not be an unconstitutional aid to religion.
If all social groups, without regard to purpose, were allowed to come
into the schools and conduct meetings which the students could attend,
religious groups, since they are social groups, would be included. In
this view the vice of the Illinois plan was that the religious function of
the groups was recognized, and only groups performing a religious func-
tion were admitted. This was certainly an aid to religion qua religion.
Although the Court in the McCollum case does not define neutrality,
75 See note 7 supra.
76 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948).
77 The religious group's definition of a religious function may not be definitive. Such
questions as the number of wives a man may have, the desirability of snake handling
and human sacrifice are social rather than religious functions, and thus subject to regu-
lation. A church building could certainly be condemned if it were unsafe for human
occupancy.
78 Cushman, "Public Support of Religious Education in American Constitutional Law,"
45 Ill. L. Rev. 333, 348 (1950).
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it is plausible to argue that the decision rests on such a concept as the
one above. True, it condemns as aid the use of the "state's tax-supported
public school buildings... for the dissemination of religious doctrines."7 9
But the whole tenor of the opinion indicates that if the school doors had
been thrown open to any group which wished to enter, that if the Com-
munity Sandlot Baseball League, the Model Railroad Club and the
American Federation of Barbershop Quartets were also permitted to offer
an official curricular program at the same time, the unconstitutional
features of the released time program would disappear. The Court's
real objection seems to be the pattern whereby "pupils compelled by
law to go to school for secular education are released in part from their
legal duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes."810
The school is fostering religion specifically, not community social life
generally.
However accurate this guess may be with regard to the McCollum
case, it is clear that in Zorach v. Clauson the Court has swung far
toward permitting aid to religion qua religion-toward thinking of the
first amendment as an equal protection clause among religions. In
writing the Court's opinion Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out that "a
callous indifference to religious groups" would amount to "preferring
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe,"'" adding
"the government must be neutral when it comes to competition between
sects .... but it can close its doors or suspend its operations as to those
who want to repair to their religious sanctuary .... ,,82 Thus in Zoracl
the "duly constituted" religious groups are allowed to furnish a part of
the official school curriculum while secular and nonbeliever groups are
denied a like opportunity. This, which would be aid under the "neu-
trality" theory, is held to be mere accommodation of "the public service
to ... [the people's] ... spiritual needs."83
But in contrast to the "released time" programs, the problems raised
by the use of the Bible in the schools are not those of mere ancillary aid
to religious groups. Here not only are the school buildings used, but
whatever religious instruction is given is given by the school officials.
It is not the problem of equal treatment for recognized groups coming
in from outside, but of equal treatment by the school officials for the
ideas which such groups espouse. Even assuming that such a practice
79 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
80 Id. at 209.
81 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
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would be constitutional it is inconceivable that a staff of public school
teachers could treat the individual doctrines of all religious sects equally.
Some groups have a doctrinal objection to any religious teaching by
laymen. Hence to some, religious training by the school would constitute
aid to religion for one religion while to others it would constitute a
preference over another. It is in this situation that the Court would be
urged to let the school aid nonsectarian religion (while refusing such
aid to sectarian religion, nonbelievers and secular ideas) on the theory
that aid to nonsectarian religion does not favor any one religion, but is
in effect equal treatment for all.
Lending support to the idea that the Court might approve this, is its
changed attitude in the Zorach case. Abandoning the strong implica-
tion of both Everson and McCollum, that religious believers are not to
be given preference over nonbelievers, the Zorack case emphasizes the
importance of religion in our society:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Be-
ing. . . . When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of pupils' events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.84
A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to the supplication
with which the Court opens each session: "God save the United States
and this Honorable Court."8 5
This is the language of the Doremus case-of any state court preparing
to sustain reading the Bible in the public schools. But despite this, even
the six justices who were willing to go this far toward helping religion
appeared to agree that "Government may not finance religious groups
nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian edu-
cation .... ",0 [Emphasis supplied]. Whether the Court chooses to forbid
the teaching of all religion or merely sectarian religion, it faces a serious
problem of definition. If it is sectarian instruction which the states can-
not undertake it faces the problem, with the aid of theories and tech-
niques already formulated by the state courts, of defining sectarianism.
If the state is to be permitted to give nonsectarian religious instruction
the Court must of necessity define the term for itself, and define it suf-
ficiently narrowly so that mere disapproval by some will not make what
is taught "sectarian." If it does this, then the school authorities will be
free to inculcate nondenominational religious beliefs in their pupils. But
those who strongly desire this goal face the almost insurmountable ob-
stacle of persuading the Court that this religion which they wish to teach,
84 Id. at 313.
85 Ibid.
86 Id. at 314.
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whose nondenominational characteristics merely make it different from
other religions, is not in fact a state established religion in violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments.
If, on the other hand, the Court holds that the state cannot give any
religious instruction, it faces the ticklish problem of defining religion.
Is, for example, teaching the germ theory of disease in hygiene class
the teaching of religion since Christian Scientists reject it on religious
grounds? Is all secular education in fact religious education because a
certain Jewish sect believes that all secular teaching is forbidden?"1
Obviously the Court must define religion for itself if each sect is not
to be a school censor, and the definition must be fairly narrow if public
schooling as we know it is to remain intact. Mr. Justice Jackson in
his concurring opinion in the McCollum case shows an acute awareness
of the "magnitude, intricacy and delicacy" of the task:
I think it remains to be demonstrated whether it is possible, even if de-
sirable, to . . . isolate and cast out of secular education all that some
people may reasonably regard as religious instruction. Perhaps subjects
such as mathematics, physics or chemistry are, or can be, completely sec-
ularized. But it would not seem practical to teach either practice or ap-
preciation of the arts if we are to forbid exposure of youth to any religious
influences. Music without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral,
or painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incom-
plete, even from a secular point of view. Yet the inspirational appeal of
religion in these guises is often stronger than in forthright sermon. Even
such a "science" as biology raises the issue between evolution and crea-
tion as an explanation of our presence on this planet. . .88
Perhaps, as Mr. Justice Jackson suggests, the answer lies in a definition
which will "prohibit teaching of creed and catechism and ceremonial and
. . . forbid forthright proselyting in the schools. . ."8* Perhaps it lies
in forbidding the teaching that there is a God, while permitting teaching
that most people believe there is a God. The decision, ultimately, must
be rooted in a wise balance between the right of society to further its
culture through collective action and the right of the individual not to
have the state interfere with the beliefs about divinity which he wishes
to instill in his child.
One other alternative is open to the Court-the one taken by the New
Jersey court in the Tudor case. This would permit the state to teach
nonsectarian religious doctrine, but let the various religious sects decide
which ideas and practices were sectarian and therefore forbidden. The
87 See People v. Donner, 199 Misc. 643 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950), reported 99 N.Y.S.2d
830 sub nom. Shapiro v. Dorin.
88 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948) (concurring opinion).
89 Ibid.
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exigencies of litigation would doubtless yield widely varying results in
different communities, and in large cities the variety of belief would
probably bar from the schools not only all religion, but a' fair share of
all public schooling. The somewhat anomalous answer to this would be
to let the sects define sectarianism within the confines of a judicially
defined concept of religion.
Compulsion
The discussion thus far has been based upon the assumption that
there is no compulsion upon the child to attend either the sectarian
classes or the nonsectarian Bible reading. Such conditions would exist if
the religious activities took place either before or after school, or if
the school-sponsored religion was offered as one of a set of elective
alternatives so varied and attractive that no pressure existed to get the
child to take the religious instruction. Under such circumstances the
only problem the Court would face would be whether there was aid to
religion. But a new vice appears when the child is required to attend-
a threat to the religious freedom of the individual. The problem of aid
to religion might be removed in the case of outsiders coming into the
school simply by giving all community groups the same privileges,
religious groups included. But such programs would have to be optional
alternatives to an otherwise available secular program, since the first
amendment would surely bar requiring a group of pupils to take "Com-
munity Activity" were the Baptists the only community group to show
up with a program. Our neutrality doctrine, useful when the state is
providing facilities or regulation, fails when the state is providing a
captive audience. By general consensus religious freedom means no one
can be compelled to take sectarian religious training.
Nor is it seriously argued that the state could force attendance at non-
sectarian religious exercises conducted by the school, assuming the
school could constitutionally conduct such training. There is no evident
dissent from the statement in the Zorach case that "government may
not . . . use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any
person." 90 [Emphasis supplied]. In fact it is altogether likely that even
subjects which could legitimately be taught in the schools could still not
be forced upon a child who objected upon religious grounds. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette91 the Court held that a
Jehovah's Witness could not be forced over his religious objections to
salute the flag or recite an oath of allegiance. But nowhere does the
90 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
91 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Court suggest that the flag salute and oath constitute religion in the
public schools.
Actually the most serious problem the Court faces is not whether a
child may be compelled to take religious training, but rather what con-
stitutes compulsion. Is a pupil who may sit in study hall while his
playmates leave for church put under compulsion to go too? Is the
pupil who may be excused from the schoolroom during the morning
devotional period under compulsion to stay? Setting aside the possibili-
ties of direct pressure by the teachers, it is argued that two kinds of
compulsion are present in any such arrangement-the pressure of con-
formity and the pressure presented by limited alternatives.
A number of psychologists, backed by parents who have tried to send
a child to school with an umbrella when "all the other kids have rain-
coats," point out the tremendous strength of the pressure to conform.
If his playmates take religious training, he wants to also. If they go to
the Catholic church he wants to go there. If Johnny has to make him-
self conspicuous by leaving the room during Bible reading he may well
stay and thus defeat his parents' wishes with regard to his religious train-
ing. The state presents the parent with the unhappy alternative of letting
his child take a disapproved religion, or of augmenting his adjustment
difficulties by insisting he be "different." As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
put it, "non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children.
The result is an obvious pressure upon children to attend."2
The answer to this argument is, of course, that these pressures to
conform are part of the normal social pattern and part of the price of
being a religious nonconformist is the social stigma which all noncon-
formists have to bear. "It may be doubted," said Mr. Justice Jackson,
"whether the Constitution which, of course, protects the right to dissent,
can be construed also to protect one from the embarrassment that always
attends nonconformity."9 3
The second claim is that the school, by offering religion as an official
alternative, is exerting compulsion on the pupils to take religious training.
The pupil is required by law to be either in church or in school, and like
the miscreant who is given a choice of ten days or $100 fine, it can
hardly be said he is not coerced merely because he chooses one alterna-
tive rather than the other. This compulsion, it is argued,, exists even
when the choices are equal, but in some cases a seductive effect is
achieved by reducing the desirability of the secular alternatives. Com-
92 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion).
93 Id. at 233.
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munity pressures, to which the school bows, are against offering such
options as gym, glee club, shop or music.
Those who claim that this is not compulsion point out that the pupil
can legitimately be required to be in school, that he does not have to go
to church, and, to pursue the analogy, offering a convict a choice between
jail (which can be required) and deportation to Russia (which cannot)
is not in any sense compulsion to go to Russia. As far as the seductive
effect goes, Professor Edward S. Corwin has called attention to the state-
ment of the Court in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis that "to hold that
motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law into
endless difficulties." 94
While the Court may well have a point, it is clear that a holding that
temptation and coercion are different will scarcely solve these difficulties.
For what is usually meant by coercion is not the actual use of physical
force. A person is coerced into a course of action by making the alterna-
tives unpalatable, and how unpalatable they have to be to achieve the
desired result depends on the circumstances and the persons involved.
The alternative of a $2 fine will tempt most motorists to obey the parking
laws, while some can only be persuaded by a stretch in the workhouse.
While a child may easily be persuaded to take religion merely by making
the secular alternative more difficult or more boring, a mature conscien-
tious objector may prefer jail to religious conformity.
However enticing the theoretical possibilities of this kind of argument,
there is evidence that the Court would consider both persuasion and
coercion bad. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in the Zorach
case, indicates that a violation of rights would exist "if it were established
that any one or more teachers were using their office to persuade or force
students to take the religious instruction." 95 [Emphasis supplied]. But
the Court refused to consider the mere inclusion of church classes in the
curriculum sufficiently persuasive or coercive to be forbidden by the Con-
stitution. "It takes obtuse reasoning," said the Court, "to inject any issue
of the 'free exercise' of religion into the present case. No one is forced to
go to the religious classroom... ."96 From this it might well be argued
that Bible reading which a child need not attend, assuming it was not in-
valid as aid to religion, would not be considered a denial of religious
freedom.
But the argument that this does not amount to persuasion is belied
94 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937).
95 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952).
96 Ibid.
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by the facts. For the whole purpose of enlisting the co-operation of the
school is to provide an attendance at religious training, be it Bible read-
ing or released time classes, which could not be obtained if school were
simply dismissed and religion had to compete for the child's free time.
The measure of the coercive effect, of the aid provided, and the infringe-
ment of rights involved, can best be measured in the reaction of religious
leaders were the school to offer training in atheism as the only alterna-
tive. It is hard to conceive that only by "obtuse reasoning" could the
state be said to be pressuring pupils into godlessness. To the extent that
religion relies upon the state to provide adherents which the power of
faith fails to attract-to that extent have we an establishment of religion.
CONCLUSIONS
The century-long judicial struggle over the use of the Bible in the
public schools has had as its fulcrum the concept of "sectarianism."
Either the definition itself or the technique of defining it has been the
crucial factor in nearly every case, including Doremus and Tudor.
When the Supreme Court hears a Bible reading case, as eventually it
must, it will certainly be pressed to adopt the familiar distinction between
sectarian religion and nonsectarian religion. So far the Court has
managed to avoid giving any real clue as to what it would do in answer
to these pressures. It has, to be sure, condemned aid to religious sects,
but never under circumstances which suggest a distinction between sec-
tarian and nonsectarian religion.
There are, however, compelling reasons why the Supreme Court should
reject such a distinction in spite of its ancient lineage. It is essentially a
parochial concept-a survivor from the days when the country knew one
dominant religious faith and differences of opinion were limited to
variations on a single basic theme. By eliminating the sectarian dif-
ferences between the Congregationalists and the Baptists it was possible
to have left a substantial body of agreement on religious principles which
could justly be called nonsectarian. It was this body of principles that
the framers of the state constitutions did not outlaw from the public
schools. There were few who disapproved, and those few were ignored
without compunction. As the court in the Tudor case notes, the same
provision of the first New Jersey constitution that provides there shall
be "'no establishment of any one religious sect in this province in
preference to another,' goes on to guarantee civil rights and the right to
hold civil office to all who are of the 'protestant sect.' "9 The disadvan-
97 14 N.J. 31, 41, 100 A.2d 857, 862 (1953).
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tages suffered by these minority groups was not a matter of serious con-
cern.
But time has turned the whole idea of sectarianism into an anachron-
ism. Not only has our country become so cosmopolitan that many of
these minority groups are no longer insignificant, but our democracy has
matured to a point where no minority is dismissed as insignificant, how-
ever small. It is not his voting strength, but the fact he is an individual
that entitles a person to enjoy his religion free from governmental pres-
sure. Each of us wants to be his brother's keeper, while firmly insisting
that he has no right to be our keeper. The freedom to believe things
that seem odd to our neighbors is a right we each demand for ourselves,
and it is the role of the Court to insure this right for those who have
not the political strength to protect themselves. The real strength of
democracy lies in individual freedom, not cultural uniformity govern-
mentally imposed.
While it seems desirable that the Court should bar not merely sectar-
ian but all religion from the public schools, the question still remains,
"What is religion?" A strongly held religious belief cannot be lightly
dismissed simply because most people feel it is a secular matter. It seems
inevitable that the Court should define "religion" for itself, and where
the issue is the public school curriculum such definition should be a
narrow one. Banned under such a definition would be outright worship,
proselyting and catechism, as well as all teaching designed to instill a
belief or nonbelief in God. But the proper interest of the community in
an educated electorate urges a definition that would leave intact the
normal school curriculum. Only those very few whose religion includes
what society in general considers secular would be the victims of such
a definition, and society's interest in education would properly outweigh
their right to keep such subjects out of the public schools. The rules of
no society could be expected to please everyone.
Those, on the other hand, who ask to be excused from these "secular"
subjects on the grounds of religious faith raise a different problem. Here
the determining factor should be not a definition of religion, but the
careful weighing of the cost to society with the cost to the individual.
In this uncertain realm there are no fixed guideposts. A person should
not be compelled to salute the flag against his religion, but probably
should be required to get a minimum education despite his convictions.
Whether he should be excused from hygiene class for religious reasons
necessarily involves weighing the benefits to society of such instruction
against the harm done to the individual and society by overriding his
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conscience. It is the decision of such controversies that calls for the
nation's best in maturity, intelligence and wisdom. The guiding spirit
that should prevail is best summed up by the great English liberal,
Edmund Burke:
Liberty, too, must be limited in order to be possessed. The degree of re-
straint it is impossible in any case to settle precisely. But it ought to be
the constant aim of every wise public counsel to find out by cautious ex-
periments, and rational, cool endeavors, with how little, not how much, of
this restraint the community can subsist.
